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                             OPINION 
                                            
 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Plaintiff James R. Philbin, Jr. appeals two orders of the 
district court, the first dated November 29, 1994, and the second 
and final order dated December 8, 1995, granting summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants.  This appeal raises issues regarding 
the elements of a cause of action pursuant to § 607(b) of the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), and the 
nature of plaintiff's burden in demonstrating a prima facie case 
pursuant to such a cause of action, questions we have not yet had 
occasion to address.  For the reasons that follow, the judgment 
of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings. 
                                I. 
     At some unspecified point in time, defendant Trans Union 
Corp. ("TUC"), a credit reporting service, prepared a credit 
report regarding Philbin that erroneously stated he was subject 
to a tax lien in the amount of approximately $9500.  Apparently, 
TUC had him confused with his father, James R. Philbin, Sr.  
Plaintiff states in an affidavit that he has never been 
delinquent on any financial obligation.  App. at 8.  That 
statement has never been shown to be false, nor has it ever been 
denied by defendants.  Philbin first notified TUC of the error in 
April of 1990.  TUC corrected the error and added a notation to 
the credit report reading: "Do not confuse with father James 
Philbin Sr different address different social security number."  
App. at 14. 
     Defendant TRW Credentials, Inc. ("TRW") had also apparently 
prepared a false credit report on Philbin, although there is no 
evidence of what inaccuracies it contained.  In the spring of 
1990, Philbin's attorney wrote a letter to TRW demanding that it 
correct its report.  Philbin apparently did not have any further 
complaints with TRW until approximately two-and-a-half years 
later. 
     In July of 1990, Philbin applied for and was denied credit 
at Macy's department store.  The reasons given were that his 
"credit profile shows delinquent past or present credit 
obligations with others" and "insufficient favorable credit 
experience."  App. at 15.  Macy's relied in whole or in part on 
the TUC report.  Philbin requested and received a copy of his 
credit report from TUC, which he concedes was wholly accurate. 
     In February of 1992, Philbin applied for and was denied a 
$1500 loan by Household International Company.  The decision was 
based in whole or in part on information received from TUC, but 
Household gave no reasons for its decision.  That April, Philbin 
filed a complaint against TUC with the New Jersey Department of 
Law and Public Safety.  That agency forwarded Philbin's complaint 
to the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").  Two months later, 
Philbin was denied a loan of approximately $10,000 from Bayview 
Marina based in whole or in part on information received from 
TUC.  The reason given was "insufficient credit file."  App. at 
25. 
     That November, Philbin was denied credit from four different 
credit granting agencies.  Philbin's application for a credit 
card from Circuit City electronics store was denied by the First 
North American National Bank, based in whole or in part on 
information received from TUC.  The reasons given for the denial 
were "number of other recent credit inquiries" and "high 
utilization of bankcard credit lines."  App. at 31.  He applied 
for a credit card from Sears department store and was denied 
credit based in whole or in part on information received from 
both TUC and TRW.  The reasons given were "unfavorable credit 
history," "number of credit bureau inquiries," and "number of 
open accounts."  App. at 27.  He was denied a Best Products 
credit card from Bank One based in whole or in part on 
information received from TUC.  The reasons given were 
"sufficient pay history not established," and "limited credit 
experience."  App. at 28.  Finally, Philbin was denied a credit 
card by Citibank based in whole or in part on information 
received from TRW.  The reason given was that "a delinquent 
credit obligation[] was recorded on [the] credit bureau report."  
App. at 44. 
     Fearing that these successive denials of credit were due to 
inaccuracies in his credit reports, Philbin requested a copy of 
his report from both TUC and TRW.  TRW promptly sent him a copy 
of his report, which Philbin concedes contained no inaccuracies, 
indicating no delinquencies and listing six open accounts. 
     Ten days after the request to TUC was made, TUC informed him 
that the address he had provided them did not match the address 
in their records and requested that he send them proof of 
residence.  The address to which he wished the report sent was 
the same address to which the 1990 report had been sent.  
However, other evidence in the record reflects that Philbin used 
two addresses.  Philbin complied and, several weeks later, he 
received a copy of his TUC report.  It erroneously stated that he 
had been released from a $9580 tax lien.  Philbin states that he 
notified TUC about the error immediately. 
     In May of 1993, after having filed the complaint in the 
instant litigation, Philbin applied for a $5000 loan from 
Nation's Credit, which informed him that it was inclined to deny 
him the loan based in whole or in part on information received 
from TUC and TRW.  He obtained from Nation's Credit a copy of 
the TUC report.  Like the report he received directly from TUC 
the previous year, it erroneously stated that he had been 
released from a $9580 tax lien.  Philbin also obtained the TRW 
report from Nation's Credit.  That report, in addition to 
containing correct information regarding him, erroneously listed 
twelve open accounts, one currently delinquent account, and four 
past delinquent accounts.  This information apparently pertained 
to Philbin's father, not to him. 
     On April 22, 1993, Philbin filed the instant suit in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County, charging TUC and TRW 
with violations of the FCRA.  He claimed that as a result of the 
inaccurate reporting of his credit history and the subsequent 
denials of credit, he suffered "deep humiliation and 
embarrassment . . . and will continue to suffer injury to his 
credit, reputation and financial standing."  App. at 3, 5.  He 
stated in an affidavit that he has suffered the humiliation and 
embarrassment of not being able to purchase items necessary to 
his business without the help of his father.  App. at 8.  
Finally, he stated that he "suffered economic injury from the 
inability to establish credit so that [he] can pursue investment 
opportunities in real property."  App. at 8. 
     TUC and TRW removed the case to the district court.  They 
subsequently moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  56 on the grounds that Philbin had 
not produced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case 
of either willful or negligent noncompliance with § 1681e(b).  On 
November 29, 1994, the district court granted TRW's motion for 
summary judgment; granted TUC's motion for summary judgment on 
the issue of willful noncompliance with § 1681e(b); and denied 
TUC's motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligent 
noncompliance with § 1681e(b). 
     In preparation for trial, the parties filed a Joint Pre- 
Trial Order, paragraph six of which stated: "None of the letters 
from the creditors . . . mentions a tax lien as a reason for 
denial of credit."  TUC's Mem. of Law at 6.  Based on this, TUC 
moved for reconsideration of the portion of its motion for 
summary judgment that had been denied.  On reconsideration, the 
district court held that, pursuant to the stipulation contained 
in the Joint Pre-Trial Order, Philbin would not be able to 
produce any evidence that the denials of credit by the credit 
granting agencies were caused by the inaccurate entry on the TUC 
report.  The district court concluded that he would therefore not 
be capable of sustaining his burden of proof on at least one 
element of his prima facie case.  Accordingly, the district court 
vacated that portion of its November 29, 1994, order denying 
summary judgment to TUC, granted TUC's motion for summary 
judgment, and dismissed the complaint.  This appeal followed. 
                               II. 
     The FCRA was enacted in order to ensure that "consumer 
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the 
needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and 
other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the 
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, 
relevancy, and proper utilization of such information."  15 
U.S.C. § 1681(b).  The FCRA was prompted by "congressional 
concern over abuses in the credit reporting industry."  Guimond 
v. Trans Union Credit Information Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th 
Cir. 1995); see also St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 884 
F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1989).  In the FCRA, Congress has 
recognized the crucial role that consumer reporting agencies play 
in collecting and transmitting consumer credit information, and 
the detrimental effects inaccurate information can visit upon 
both the individual consumer and the nation's economy as a whole.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1), (3). 
     Title 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) provides:  "Whenever a consumer 
reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow 
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the 
information concerning the individual about whom the report 
relates."  It is undisputed that TUC and TRW are "consumer 
reporting agenc[ies]" within the terms of 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f), 
the credit reports they produced are "consumer report[s]" within 
the meaning of § 1681a(d), and Philbin is a "consumer" for 
purposes of § 1681a(c).  Sections 1681n and 1681o of Title 15 
respectively provide private rights of action for willful and 
negligent noncompliance with any duty imposed by the FCRA and 
allow recovery for actual damages and attorneys fees and costs, 
as well as punitive damages in the case of willful noncompliance.  
See Casella v. Equifax Credit Information Servs., 56 F.3d 469, 
473 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1452 (1996); Guimond, 
45 F.3d at 1332; Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 284 
(7th Cir. 1994); Cahlin v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 
F.2d 1151, 1156 & n.4 (11th Cir. 1991). 
                                A. 
     The parties agree that a case of negligent noncompliance 
with § 1681e(b) consists of four elements: (1) inaccurate 
information was included in a consumer's credit report; (2) the 
inaccuracy was due to defendant's failure to follow reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy; (3) the consumer 
suffered injury; and (4) the consumer's injury was caused by the 
inclusion of the inaccurate entry.  See Morris v. Credit Bureau 
of Cincinnati, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 962, 967 (S.D. Ohio 1983); 
Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1980), 
aff'd, 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982).  Defendants do not dispute 
they both produced at least one report that contained inaccurate 
information about Philbin.  Nor do they contest that Philbin's 
emotional distress damages are cognizable.  See Guimond, 45 F.3d 
at 1333; Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 296 (5th Cir. 
1993); Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 834-35 
(8th Cir. 1976).  Moreover, TUC apparently concedes that Philbin 
has satisfied his burden on summary judgment of producing facts 
from which a reasonable jury could infer that it did not follow 
reasonable procedures.  As other courts have held, "[a]llowing 
inaccurate information back onto a credit report after deleting 
it because it is inaccurate is negligent."  Stevenson, 987 F.2d 
at 293; see also Morris, 563 F. Supp. at 968. 
     As their main contention, both defendants urge that Philbin 
has failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 
trier of fact could conclude that the inaccuracies in the reports 
were the cause of Philbin's damages.  TRW additionally contends 
that Philbin has failed to produce any evidence that it failed to 
follow reasonable procedures.  We address these contentions in 
reverse order. 
                                1. 
                      Reasonable Procedures 
     Reasonable procedures are those that "`a reasonably prudent 
person would [undertake] under the circumstances.'" Stewart v. 
Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam) (quoting Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 689 F.2d 72, 78 (6th Cir. 
1982)) (alteration added).  "Judging the reasonableness of a[ 
credit reporting] agency's procedures involves weighing the 
potential harm from inaccuracy against the burden of safeguarding 
against such inaccuracy."  Id. 
     TRW urges that Philbin must come forward with affirmative 
proof that it failed to use reasonable procedures to assure 
maximum accuracy and that he has failed to do so.  It cites a 
number of cases for the proposition that the FCRA "does not make 
reporting agencies strictly liable for all inaccuracies" that 
appear on a consumer report it prepares.  Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 
1156; see also Stewart, 734 F.2d at 51; Bryant, 689 F.2d at 78; 
Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509, 513 
(5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Equifax, Inc. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 678 F.2d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir. 1982); Hauser v. 
Equifax, Inc., 602 F.2d 811, 814 (8th Cir. 1979); Neptune v. 
Trans Union Corp., 1993 WL 505601, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 1993), 
aff'd, 27 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994); Hussain v. Carteret Sav. Bank, 
F.A., 704 F. Supp. 567, 569 (D.N.J. 1989). 
     TRW accurately states that consumer reporting agencies are 
liable only when inaccuracies are the result of their failure to 
follow reasonable procedures.  However, this statement gives 
little guidance as to the nature of the plaintiff's burden of 
proof on the "reasonable procedures" issue on a motion for 
summary judgment.  We must determine the nature and quantum of 
proof, if any, beyond the mere fact of an inaccuracy, that a 
plaintiff must provide in order for a reasonable trier of fact to 
conclude that reasonable procedures were not followed. 
     We are guided in this endeavor by those courts of appeals 
that have addressed this question.  We note, however, that there 
is a divergence among the approaches those courts have taken.  In 
Stewart, 734 F.2d at 51 n.5, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit noted that although it was unaware 
of any cases "directly addressing who has the burden of proving 
reasonableness of procedures, courts have generally assumed that 
burden falls on the plaintiff" (citing Hauser, 602 F.2d at 814- 
15; Morris, 563 F. Supp. at 968; Alexander v. Moore & Assocs., 
Inc., 553 F. Supp. 948, 954 (D. Haw. 1982)).  Accordingly, it 
held that 
                    a plaintiff cannot rest on a showing of a 
                    mere inaccuracy, shifting to the defendant 
                    the burden of proof on the reasonableness of 
                    procedures for ensuring accuracy:  There is 
                    no indication that Congress meant to so shift 
                    the nominal plaintiff's burden of proof as to 
                    requisite components of a claim based on a 
                    statutory violation.  Thus, we conclude that 
                    a plaintiff must minimally present some 
                    evidence from which a trier of fact can infer 
                    that the consumer reporting agency failed to 
                    follow reasonable procedures in preparing a 
                    credit report. 
                     
          Id. at 51 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
     However, the court went on to hold that, in order to satisfy 
this "minimal[]" burden, "a plaintiff need not introduce direct 
evidence of unreasonableness of procedures:  In certain 
instances, inaccurate credit reports by themselves can fairly be 
read as evidencing unreasonable procedures, and . . . in such 
instances plaintiff's failure to present direct evidence will not 
be fatal to his claim."  Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added).  While 
the Stewart court did not definitively spell out what those 
"certain instances" were, it did give some guidance.  For 
example, it cited with approval Bryant, 487 F. Supp. at 1242, in 
which the court concluded that inconsistencies between two 
different reports concerning the plaintiff "imposed a duty on the 
reporting agency to verify the information in those reports."  
Stewart, 734 F.2d at 52.  The court also approvingly cited 
Morris, 563 F. Supp. at 968, in which the court likewise found 
"the existence of . . . two similar files [on plaintiff] to be a 
sufficient indicium of unreasonable procedures to satisfy the 
plaintiffs' `burden.'"  Stewart, 734 F.2d at 52.  The D.C. 
Circuit concluded:  "Certainly . . . inconsistencies between two 
files or reports involving less fundamental inaccuracies [than a 
falsely reported wage earner plan] can provide sufficient grounds 
for inferring that an agency acted negligently in failing to 
verify information."  Id. 
     In an even broader holding, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit recently wrote: 
                    In order to make out a prima facie violation 
                    under § 1681e(b), a consumer must present 
                    evidence tending to show that a credit 
                    reporting agency prepared a report containing 
                    inaccurate information.  The FCRA does not 
                    impose strict liability, however -- an agency 
                    can escape liability if it establishes that 
                    an inaccurate report was generated despite 
                    the agency's following reasonable procedures. 
                     
          Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote 
omitted); see also id. at 1334 ("Guimond has made out a prima 
facie case under § 1681e(b) by showing that there were 
inaccuracies in her credit report.").  Similarly, the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit wrote: 
                    In order to make out a prima facie violation 
                    of [§ 1681e(b)], the Act implicitly requires 
                    that a consumer must present evidence tending 
                    to show that a credit reporting agency 
                    prepared a report containing "inaccurate" 
                    information. . . .  The Act, however, does 
                    not make reporting agencies strictly liable 
                    for all inaccuracies.  The agency can escape 
                    liability if it establishes that an 
                    inaccurate report was generated by following 
                    reasonable procedures, which will be a jury 
                    question in the overwhelming majority of 
                    cases.  Thus, prior to sending a [§ 1681e(b)] 
                    claim to the jury, a credit reporting agency 
                    can usually prevail only if a court finds, as 
                    a matter of law, that a credit report was 
                    "accurate." 
                     
          Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1156 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
     The language from Guimond and Cahlin may be interpreted in 
two different ways.  A broader reading is that, once a plaintiff 
demonstrates inaccuracies in a credit report, the burden shifts 
to the defendant to prove as an affirmative defense the presence 
of reasonable procedures.  But see Stewart, 734 F.2d at 51 n.5 
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681d(c) and 1681m(c) for the proposition 
that Congress "`knew how' to shift the burden of proof from 
plaintiff to defendant by explicitly doing so"). 
     A somewhat narrower, and more plausible, reading is that a 
plaintiff may present his case to the jury on the issue of 
reasonable procedures merely by showing an inaccuracy in the 
consumer report and nothing more, but the burden does not shift 
to the defendant.  Rather, a jury may, but need not, infer from 
the inaccuracy that the defendant failed to follow reasonable 
procedures. 
     This position imposes a less stringent burden on the 
plaintiff than does the position taken in Stewart, which requires 
some unspecified quantum of evidence beyond a mere inaccuracy, 
such as the existence of a second report, inconsistent with the 
first, in order for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment.  On 
the other hand, it does not entirely relieve the plaintiff of his 
burden of proving to the jury a lack of reasonable procedures and 
instead impose on the defendant an affirmative obligation to 
prove that reasonable procedures were in place. 
     This "middle position" is akin to the common law rule of resipsa 
loquitur, which permits but does not require the jury to 
infer negligence from certain predicate facts.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 328 D (1965).            The justification for 
importing 
                    such a rule into the FCRA context would be that, as in 
the 
                    traditional res ipsa situation, the inaccuracy has 
been caused by 
                    an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the 
defendant.  
                    Such a defendant is in a far better position to prove 
that 
                    reasonable procedures were followed than a plaintiff 
is to prove 
                    the opposite. 
                         Pursuant to either reading of Guimond and Cahlin, 
once a 
                    plaintiff has demonstrated inaccuracies in the report, 
a 
                    defendant could prevail on summary judgment only if it 
were to 
                    produce evidence that demonstrates as a matter of law 
that the 
                    procedures it followed were reasonable.  See, e.g., 
Henson, 29 
                    F.3d at 285 ("[A]s a matter of law, a credit reporting 
agency is 
                    not liable under the FCRA for reporting inaccurate 
information 
                    obtained from a court's Judgment Docket, absent prior 
notice from 
                    the consumer that the information may be 
inaccurate."). 
                         Having discussed these three possibilities (that 
a plaintiff 
                    must produce some evidence beyond a mere inaccuracy in 
order to 
                    demonstrate the failure to follow reasonable 
procedures; that the 
                    jury may infer the failure to follow reasonable 
procedures from 
                    the mere fact of an inaccuracy; or that upon 
demonstrating an 
                    inaccuracy, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
prove that 
                    reasonable procedures were followed), we find it 
unnecessary to 
                    decide among them.  Pursuant to either reading of 
Guimond and 
                    Cahlin, plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to 
survive 
                    summary judgment on the issue of reasonable procedures 
merely by 
                    demonstrating that there were inaccuracies in the TRW 
report.  
                    Moreover, even under the rule enunciated in Stewart, 
plaintiff 
                    has produced sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable trier of 
                    fact could infer that TRW did not follow reasonable 
procedures.  
                    The court there stated that "[i]n certain instances, 
inaccurate 
                    credit reports by themselves can fairly be read as 
evidencing 
                    unreasonable procedures."  Stewart, 734 F.2d at 52.  
As one 
                    specific example of such an instance, the court 
posited that 
                    where there exist two or more inconsistent reports, 
and the 
                    inconsistency relates to inaccurate information 
contained in at 
                    least one of the reports, a jury could reasonably 
conclude that 
                    the defendant failed to follow reasonable procedures. 
                         Here, TRW issued two reports that were 
inconsistent with 
                    each other.  Unquestionably, one was inaccurate.  The 
          inconsistencies related to the inaccurate information.            
Pursuant 
                    to Stewart, and a fortiori pursuant to either of the 
two readings 
                    of Guimond and Cahlin, these facts alone are 
sufficient to allow 
                    a jury to infer that TRW did not follow reasonable 
procedures. 
                                          2. 
                                      Causation 
                         Both TUC and TRW contend that there is no 
evidence that the 
                    inaccuracy of the credit reports, even if the result 
of 
                    unreasonable procedures, caused Philbin's injuries.  
Given the 
                    existence of one accurate and one inaccurate report 
prepared by 
                    each agency, they claim that there is no evidence from 
which a 
                    reasonable trier of fact could infer both (1) that the 
credit 
                    granting agencies utilized the inaccurate as opposed 
to the 
                    accurate versions; and (2) even assuming that the 
inaccurate 
                    versions were used, that the inaccurate entries were 
the cause of 
          the denial of credit.           
                         The district court agreed with defendants and 
granted 
                    summary judgment on this basis, holding that a 
"plaintiff must 
                    establish that `the denial was not caused by factors 
other than 
                    the alleged inaccurate entry.'" Philbin v. Trans Union 
Corp., No. 
                    93-cv-2360 (JBS), at 13 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1995) 
("Philbin II") 
                    (quoting Neptune, 1993 WL 505601 at *2)); Philbin v. 
Trans Union 
                    Corp., No. 93-cv-2360 (JBS), at 11 (D.N.J. Nov. 29, 
1994) 
                    ("Philbin I") (quoting Neptune, 1993 WL 505601 at 
*2)); see alsoEvans v. Credit Bureau, 904 F. Supp. 123, 126 (W.D.N.Y. 
1995); 
                    Pendleton v. Trans Union Systems Corp., 76 F.R.D. 192, 
195 (E.D. 
                    Pa. 1977) ("[A] consumer who was denied credit must 
show that the 
                    denial was caused by inaccurate entries . . . rather 
than by 
                    correct adverse entries or any other factors."). 
                         Although the district court did not say so 
explicitly, it 
                    appears that it concluded that Philbin could not show 
that the 
                    inaccurate information was the "but for" cause of his 
injury, 
                    because he could not show that the harm would not have 
occurred 
                    absent the inaccurate entry.  While we agree with the 
district 
                    court that a FCRA plaintiff must prove causation by a 
                    preponderance of the evidence, we disagree that 
Philbin has 
                    failed to produce sufficient facts from which a 
reasonable jury 
                    could find that defendants' alleged negligence caused 
his 
                    injuries.  A comparison of the record here with the 
facts of the 
                    cases relied upon by the district court and defendants 
bears this 
                    out. 
                         In Neptune, that court did indeed find that 
plaintiff had 
                    not established "that the denial [of credit] was not 
caused by 
                    factors other than the alleged inaccurate entry."  
1993 WL 505601 
                    at *2.  However, it noted: 
                    It is undisputed that at the time plaintiff 
                    claims he was denied credit based on TUC's 
                    violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 
                    he was in default on an obligation to re-pay 
                    a student loan, he was in default on an 
                    obligation to re-pay a commercial loan from 
                    ITT Financial Services, he was failing to 
                    comply with a court order requiring him to 
                    pay child support, and he had virtually no 
                    income and no assets. 
                     
          Id.  The court in addition noted how unusual it was for a 
plaintiff to contend that he had been denied credit due to an 
inaccurate credit report while at the same time applying for and 
receiving leave to proceed in forma pauperis.  See id. at *1-2.  
Thus, the court's statement regarding the plaintiff's burden vis- 
à-vis the causation issue must be read in light of the fact that 
there were indisputably numerous additional reasons plaintiff 
could have been denied credit. 
     Similarly, in Evans, 904 F. Supp. at 126, the defendant 
introduced affidavit testimony from an employee of the credit 
granting agency that plaintiff had been denied a loan because he 
had filed for bankruptcy within two years prior to the loan 
application.  The presence of undisputed, correct, adverse 
information on the credit report, along with the unrebutted 
testimony of one responsible for the credit-granting decision, 
arguably supports the conclusion that no reasonable jury could 
conclude that the presence of inaccurate entries on the reports 
made a difference as to the decision whether to grant or deny 
credit. 
     In Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1156, 1161, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld a grant of summary judgment to the defendant only after 
all of the credit grantor's records had been subpoenaed and there 
was no indication that an adverse credit report prepared by the 
defendant had ever been used in making the credit decision, much 
less any indication that such a report had been a causal factor 
in the decision.  See also Wood v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 508 F.2d 
167, 172 (5th Cir. 1975). 
     In contrast with these cases, the facts of the instant case 
more closely resemble those in Lendino v. Trans Union Credit 
Information Co., 970 F.2d 1110, 1111-12 (2d Cir. 1992), in which 
adverse outdated information was included on one of three credit 
reports concerning the plaintiff prepared by the defendant, in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681c.  The other two reports contained 
"no delinquent credit accounts or any other adverse information."  
Id. at 1112.  The plaintiff was denied credit by Bloomingdale's 
department store after its credit department reviewed one or more 
of the three reports, but it is unclear which of the reports it 
had seen.  See id. at 1112-13.  Although the only report that 
indicated it had been accessed by Bloomingdale's was one of the 
valid versions, the plaintiff testified that an employee of the 
defendant told him that Bloomingdale's had obtained all three 
reports.  See id. at 1112.  The district court granted summary 
judgment to the defendant based on the conclusion that there was 
no evidence that the credit grantor had seen the invalid version 
of the report.  See id. at 1111-12. 
     The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a reasonable jury 
could indeed infer that Bloomingdale's had seen the invalid 
report and denied plaintiff credit based on that report, because 
"[t]here is, at least on the present record, no other evidence 
which reasonably demonstrates why Bloomingdale's rejected 
Lendino's credit application."  Id. at 1113.  At oral argument, 
counsel for TUC was unable persuasively to distinguish Lendinofrom the 
instant case. 
     Here, the district court originally held that because the 
accurate report prepared by TUC appeared to contain no delinquent 
accounts, and because Philbin stated in his affidavit that he has 
never been delinquent on an account (which statement is not 
disputed by defendants), Philbin could convince a jury, "by 
process of elimination," Philbin I at 19, that the credit 
granting agencies must have both used the inaccurate report and 
considered the inaccurate information on that report in reaching 
their decisions to deny credit.  On reconsideration, however, in 
light of the stipulation in the Joint Pre-Trial Order that none 
of the rejection letters specifically cites the erroneous 
information, the district court reversed itself and granted 
summary judgment to TUC. 
     With respect to TRW, the report Philbin received in November 
of 1992, contemporaneously with the denials of credit from Sears 
and Citibank, was concededly correct.  The inaccurate TRW report, 
which he received from a credit granting agency, was received six 
months later.  The district court concluded that Philbin's 
contention that Sears and Citibank used the inaccurate report 
rather than the accurate one was sheer speculation, and therefore 
granted summary judgment to TRW. 
     As a preliminary matter, we must acknowledge that we are at 
a loss to explain the consequence ascribed by the district court 
to the stipulation in the Joint Pre-Trial Order that none of the 
rejection letters specifically cites the inaccurate information.  
At the time of its initial determination, discovery was complete 
and Philbin had failed to submit any deposition or affidavit 
testimony of those individuals who had made the decisions to deny 
him credit.  Thus, both initially and on reconsideration, the 
rejection letters (which omit to state that the erroneous entry 
was the cause of the denial of credit), the fact that the 
accurate reports contained no adverse information, Philbin's 
statement that he had never been delinquent on an account, and 
the "process of elimination" argument to be drawn from this 
evidence were all that Philbin could have presented to a jury.  
Yet these were deemed sufficient initially as against TUC and 
insufficient on reconsideration. 
     More fundamentally, the district court erred by assuming 
that Philbin could satisfy his burden only by introducing direct 
evidence that consideration of the inaccurate entry was crucial 
to the decision to deny credit.  While Philbin's case might have 
been stronger had he deposed or taken affidavits of those 
responsible for the decision, such evidence is not essential to 
make out a prima facie case pursuant to § 1681e(b).  We deem it 
sufficient that, as with most other tort actions, a FCRA 
plaintiff produce evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact 
could infer that the inaccurate entry was a "substantial factor" 
that brought about the denial of credit.  Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 431(a); Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 41, at 
266-68 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton].  Philbin has 
met that burden in this instance as to each of the six credit 
denials encompassed by his complaint. 
     Because the accurate reports apparently contained no adverse 
information and because it is undisputed that Philbin has never 
been delinquent on a credit obligation, when Sears denied him 
credit because of an "unfavorable credit history," App. at 27, a 
reasonable jury certainly could infer that Sears was referring to 
the inaccurate adverse information contained in the inaccurate 
reports.  See Lendino, 970 F.2d at 1113. 
     Household International gave no reason for the denial of 
credit.  Again, however, given the absence of correct, adverse 
information concerning Philbin, a trier of fact could reasonably 
infer, by necessary implication, that the inaccurate adverse 
information must have played a substantial role in its decision 
to deny credit. 
     Finally, three credit grantors -- Bayview Marina, Bank One, 
and First North American Bank -- gave reasons for denying credit 
that appear to be innocuous.  These include:  "insufficient 
credit file," "sufficient pay history not established," "limited 
credit experience," "number of other recent credit inquiries," 
and "high utilization of bankcard credit lines."  App. at 25, 28, 
31.  While these present a closer question, we conclude that a 
trier of fact could reasonably infer that the inaccurate adverse 
information included on the inaccurate credit report was an 
additional, unstated reason for the credit denials.  Moreover, as 
to Bank One, which stated that it denied credit because of 
Philbin's lack of credit history, one could infer that this lack 
of a credit history was itself due, at least in part, to his 
inability to get credit because of the inaccurate reports. 
     Philbin's case against TRW is somewhat more attenuated than 
his case against TUC, given that the inaccurate report surfaced 
some six months after the denial of credit by Sears and Citibank. 
However, we find that evidence of the existence of two 
inconsistent reports within six months of each other allows a 
reasonable trier of fact to infer that the two reports existed 
simultaneously in November of 1992, at the time of the denials of 
credit.  This, taken along with the fact that the accurate report 
apparently contained no information adverse to Philbin and the 
undisputed fact that he has never been delinquent on any credit 
obligation, would allow a reasonable trier of fact to infer both 
that Citibank and Sears saw the inaccurate TRW report and that 
the inaccurate information was a substantial factor in bringing 
about the denial of credit.  See Lendino, 970 F.2d at 1113.  This 
is especially true given that the reasons supplied by Sears for 
the denial included "unfavorable credit history," and the reason 
supplied by Citibank was "a delinquent credit obligation[] was 
recorded on [the] credit bureau report."  App. at 27, 44. 
     We note also that the district court's language might be 
understood as imposing a burden on a FCRA plaintiff of proving 
that the inaccurate information was the sole cause of the denial 
of credit.  We reject such a view as inconsistent with 
traditional notions of tort law and the reality of human 
decision-making.  While a plaintiff must prove that the 
inaccurate entry was "a substantial factor in bringing about" the 
denial of credit, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431(a), he need not 
eliminate the possibility that "correct adverse entries or any 
other factors," Pendleton, 76 F.R.D. at 195, also entered into 
the decision to deny credit.  See Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1161 
(plaintiff "bears the burden of proving that [defendant's] credit 
report was a causal factor in the denial of" credit) (emphasis 
added); Stewart, 734 F.2d at 54 ("[A] trier of fact could 
reasonably conclude that [defendant] denied [plaintiff] 
membership at least in part because of the adverse credit report, 
and summary judgment was inappropriate.") (emphasis added); seealso 
Prosser & Keeton § 41, at 268 ("If the defendant's conduct was 
a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, it 
follows that he will not be absolved from liability merely 
because other causes have contributed to the result . . . ."). 
     Forcing a plaintiff affirmatively to rule out other 
explanations for the credit denial ignores the fact that 
decisions to deny credit will frequently have more than one 
cause.  For example, in some instances the inaccurate entry and 
another factor may each, considered separately, be insufficient 
to have caused the denial of credit but when taken together are 
sufficient.  Each may then be considered a substantial factor in 
bringing about the denial of credit and therefore a cause of 
plaintiff's injury.  See Prosser & Keeton § 41, at 266-67 & n.25. 
     Courts have recognized that where a decision-making process 
implicates a wide range of considerations, all of which factor 
into the ultimate decision, it is inappropriate to saddle a 
plaintiff with the burden of proving that one of those factors 
was the cause of the decision.  See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241, 244, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 1785, 1787 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (finding that "Title VII [of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964] meant to condemn even those decisions based 
on a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations," and 
concluding that Title VII plaintiff must show illegitimate 
consideration "played a motivating part in an employment 
decision"); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563 (1977) 
(plaintiff claiming equal protection violation need not "prove 
that the challenged action rested solely on racially 
discriminatory purposes" but only that such a purpose was "a 
motivating factor in the decision").  Indeed, where multiple 
factors exist, any inquiry into the cause of a decision would be 
a meaningless endeavor.  See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247, 
109 S.Ct. at 1788-89 (plurality opinion). 
     We hasten to add that the burden of proving causation 
remains with the plaintiff at all times and never shifts to the 
defendant.  We conclude however that even on this sparse record, 
a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the inaccurate 
entries were a substantial factor in bringing about Philbin's 
injuries.  Accordingly, Philbin has produced evidence sufficient 
to satisfy his burden of proving a prima facie case of negligent 
noncompliance with 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) as to each defendant. 
                                B. 
     By contrast, we agree with the district court that Philbin 
has not produced sufficient evidence of willful noncompliance 
with § 1681e(b) to survive summary judgment.  To show willful 
noncompliance with the FCRA, Philbin must show that defendants 
"knowingly and intentionally committed an act in conscious 
disregard for the rights of others," but need not show "malice or 
evil motive."  Pinner v. Schmidt, 805 F.2d 1258, 1263 (5th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1022, 107 S.Ct. 3267 (1987); seealso 
Casella, 56 F.3d at 476. 
     Philbin claims that TUC is liable for a willful violation 
because he notified it of the error several times and TUC failed 
to correct it.  However, after the first notification, in 1990, 
TUC did remove the erroneous information for a period of time.  
Moreover, he contends that his filing of a complaint with the FTC 
gave TUC notice a second time, but there is no evidence that TUC 
had notice of the complaint.  There appears to be one instance -- 
in November of 1992 -- when he notified TUC that, despite the 
earlier correction, the error re-appeared, and TUC failed to 
correct it.  This, however, falls short of evidence of a willful 
violation. 
     Philbin also claims that TUC's refusal to send him a copy of 
his credit report in November of 1992 evidences a willful 
violation.  However, it appears that TUC merely desired to verify 
his address.  Moreover, the record reflects that Philbin had two 
mailing addresses, and so TUC's concern appears to be bona fide.  
After receiving verification of his address, TUC eventually sent 
him a copy of the report.  Its actions do not rise to the level 
of a "willful misrepresentation[] or concealment[]" that 
justifies finding a willful violation.  Pinner, 805 F.2d at 1263; 
cf. Millstone, 528 F.2d at 834. 
     Philbin's case against TRW for a willful violation is even 
weaker.  He claims that after the 1990 letter and the 1992 filing 
with the FTC, TRW had notice of the inaccuracies and nonetheless 
circulated the inaccurate report.  However, there is no evidence 
that the alleged errors that precipitated the 1990 letter are the 
same as those that appeared on the 1993 report.  Moreover, the 
1990 letter is so far removed temporally from the 1993 report 
that it would strain the concept of notice to conclude that the 
former provided notice of errors in the latter.  Further, 
Philbin's FTC filing concerned his problems only with TUC, not 
TRW.  There is, therefore, no evidence of willful behavior on the 
part of TRW. 
                               III. 
     The order of the district court, dated November 29, 1994, 
granting summary judgment to both defendants as to the claims for 
willful noncompliance with § 1681e(b) will be affirmed.  The 
orders dated November 29, 1994, and December 8, 1995, granting 
summary judgment to defendants as to the claims for negligent 
noncompliance with § 1681e(b) will be reversed.  The matter is 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
     Costs taxed against appellees. 
